The modal systems S1-S3 were introduced by C. I. Lewis as logics for strict implication. While there are Kripke semantics for S2 and S3, there is no known natural semantics for S1. We extend S1 by a Substitution Principle SP which generalizes a reference rule of S1. In system S1+SP, the relation of strict equivalence ϕ ≡ ψ satisfies the identity axioms of R. Suszko's non-Fregean logic adapted to the language of modal logic (we call these axioms the axioms of propositional identity). This enables us to develop a framework of algebraic semantics which captures S1+SP as well as the Lewis systems S3-S5. So from the viewpoint of algebraic semantics, S1+SP turns out to be an interesting modal logic. We show that S1+SP is strictly contained between S1 and S3 and differs from S2. It is the weakest modal logic containing S1 such that strict equivalence is axiomatized by propositional identity.
Introduction
Discontented with the notion of material implication found in the Principia Mathematica, C. I. Lewis introduced axiomatizations of strict implication [12, 13] . These systems are known as the non-normal modal logics S1, S2 and S3. In [13] also appeared (deductively equivalent systems of) the modal logics S4 and S5 which, however, are not accepted by Lewis as systems for strict implication. Possible worlds semantics for modal logics was introduced years later by S. Kripke and has become the standard semantics. Normal Kripke semantics involves rather strong modal principles such as the Necessitation Rule. Some systems which do not validate the Necessitation Rule, such as S2 and S3, can be captured by Kripke semantics if one is ready to accept the concept of a non-normal world. The semantical treatment of other logics in the vicinity of S1, however, seems to be more complicated. In fact, the known semantics for S1 (M. J. Cresswell [6, 7] , see also R. Girle [8, 9] ) and related systems (see, e.g., B. F. Chellas and K. Segerberg [3] ) are technically more complex and mostly unintuitive.
In this paper, we are inspired by ideas coming from R. Suszko's non-Fregean logic ( [2, 20] , see also [16] ). The essential feature of a non-Fregean logic is an identity quence of modal systems S1+SP, S3, S4, S5. A nice feature of this framework is that normal and non-normal systems are captured in a conceptually uniform way. We obtain strong completeness theorems. We also show that the inclusions S1⊆(S1+SP)⊆S3 are strict, and (S1+SP) =S2. S1+SP can be characterized as the weakest modal logic containing S1 such that the relation of strict equivalence is given by propositional identity.
The modal logic S1+SP
The set F m of formulas of modal propositional logic is defined in the usual way over a set V = {x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , ...} of propositional variables, logical connectives ¬, → and the modal operator for necessity. If x is a variable and ϕ, ψ are formulas, then we write ϕ[x := ψ] for the formula that results from substituting ψ for all occurrences of x in ϕ. We use the following abbreviations:
In particular, ϕ ≡ ψ reads as strict equivalence of ϕ and ψ. The following axiomatization of Lewis system S1 is due to E. J. Lemmon [11] . In contrast to Lewis original axiomatization found in [13] , Lemmon's axiomatization is formulated as an extension of the calculus of (non-modal) propositional logic. All formulas of the following form, and only those, are axioms: (i) formulas which have the form of a propositional tautology
The inference rules of S1 are
• Modus Ponens MP: "From ϕ and ϕ → ψ infer ψ."
• Axiom Necessitation AN: "If ϕ is an axiom, then infer ϕ."
• Substitution of Proved Strict Equivalents SPSE: "If ψ ≡ ψ ′ is a theorem, then any formula of the form ϕ[
Lewis system S3 results from S1 by adding (3) (ϕ → ψ) → ( ϕ → ψ) as axiom scheme. Rule AN now applies to the axioms (i)-(iii) and also to (3). We write S3=S1+(3). We shall see that S2 cannot be captured by our semantic approach, so we do not give an axiomatization of that system here (see, e.g., [10] for a Lemmon-style axiomatization). S1 proves to be sound with respect to the algebraic semantics presented below. However, it is not complete: rule SPSE is too weak. Therefore, we generalize SPSE to the following Substitution Rule SR:
Then formulas of the form
On the other hand, modulo S1, rule SR derives from SP together with transitivity of implication. That is, SR and SP are equivalent modulo S1.
Scheme SP is what we call the Substitution Principle of non-Fregean logic (see also, e.g., [15] , Lemma 3.3). Actually, it represents a general ontological law known as the Indiscernibility of Identicals. In basic non-Fregean logic SCI, principle SP follows from the identity axioms (e)-(g) of Definition 1.1 in [2] ; see also the remark following Proposition 1.3 in [2] . If we adapt Suszko's identity axioms to the modal language, then SP is established by the following axioms:
It is not hard to recognize that (iv)-(vi) are equivalent with scheme SP. That is, SP can be seen as an abbreviation of (iv)-(vi). In the following, we consider the modal system S1+SP which results from S1 by adding the axiom schemes (iv)-(vi) (and ignoring rule SPSE which is weaker than SP). As in S1, the inference rules are again MP and AN. However, the application of rule AN remains restricted to the axioms (i)-(iii) of the original system S1. A derivation of a formula ϕ from a set of formulas Φ in system S1+SP is a finite sequence of formulas ϕ 0 , ..., ϕ n = ϕ such that for each i = 0, ..., n, formula ϕ i is either an element of Φ, or it is an axiom, or it is the conclusion of rule AN applied to an axiom of type (i)-(iii), or it is the conclusion of rule MP with premises that appear as ϕ j and ϕ k = (ϕ j → ϕ i ) in the sequence with j, k < j. We write Φ ⊢ ϕ if there exists a derivation of ϕ from Φ in deductive system S1+SP.
If we let rule AN be applicable to all axioms (i)-(vi), then we get a stronger system which we denote by S1+ SP. Both S1+SP and S1+ SP are sublogics of S3 as we shall see below.
If we consider the Lemmon-style axiomatization of system S2 such as given in [10] , then S3=S2+(3), where AN applies here to all axioms of S2 and also to (3). S2 contains a rule called Becker's Rule: "If (ϕ → ψ) is a theorem, then ( ϕ → ψ) is a theorem." Now observe that scheme (3) generalizes Becker's rule in exactly the same way as SP generalizes the S1-rule SPSE. That is, S1+ SP corresponds to S1 in the way as S3 corresponds to S2. The logic S1+ SP, however, is less important for our purposes. In the present paper, we are interested in a minimal modal logic which can be integrated into the hierarchy of Lewis systems S1-S5 such that strict equivalence satisfies SP, i.e., the axioms (iv)-(vi). It turns out that S1+SP is strong enough for our purposes. So we will focus on that system.
The following Deduction Theorem can be shown by induction on the length of a derivation, similarly as in [14] , Lemma 2.3.
Proof. By rule AN we derive the following:
, where x is a fresh variable. By SP,
By axiom (iii), the identity connective is transitive. Thus, (c) and
The formula on the right hand side of the last equation is obviously a theorem. Then the formula on the left hand side is a theorem, too. Q.E.D.
We shall refer to the scheme ϕ ↔ (ϕ ≡ ⊤) as principle N. It says that a proposition denoted by ϕ is necessary iff ϕ and ⊤ denote the same proposition. In other words, "There is exactly one necessary proposition".
Lemma 2.3 Modal principle K is a theorem:
, by applying two times the Deduction Theorem. Q.E.D.
Semantics
A Boolean algebra is usually given by a non-empty universe together with operations for join, meet, complement and two distinguished elements (the smallest and the greatest element w.r.t. the induced lattice ordering) such that certain equations are satisfied. In the following definition we make use of the fact that, by interdefinability of operations, a Boolean algebra can be equivalently given by operations for complement and implication. 
We will make tacitly use of this fact in some of the proofs below. The conditions (i)-(iii) in the definition ensure that T RU E is an ultrafilter of the Boolean lattice. The conditions (v) and (vi) are semantic counterparts of applications of rule AN to the axioms (ii) and (iii), respectively. Condition (iv) specifies the properties of the modal operator. Later, we will strengthen that condition in order to obtain semantics for stronger modal logics, namely for the Lewis systems S3-S5.
Definition 3.2 Let M be a model. An assignment of propositions to formulas is a function γ : V → M which extends in the canonical way to a function γ : F m → M (we refer to the extension again by γ).
5 That is, The following result says that the defined connective ≡ has the intended semantics, i.e., it is an identity connective:
is a model and γ is a corresponding assignment, then we call the tuple (M, γ) an interpretation. The satisfaction relation between interpretations and formulas is defined by (M, γ) ϕ :⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ T RU E.

This definition extends in the usual way to sets of formulas. For a set of formulas
Theorem 3.3 If (M, γ) is an interpretation and ϕ, ψ ∈ F m, then (M, γ) ϕ ≡ ψ ⇔ γ(ϕ) = γ(ψ). Proof. Suppose (M, γ) ϕ ≡ ψ. That is, (M, γ) (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ). Let γ(ϕ) = m and γ(ψ) = m ′ . Then follows that f (f → (m, m ′ )) ∈ T RU E and f (f → (m ′ , m)) ∈ T RU E. Thus, m ≤ m ′ and m ′ ≤ m, and finally m = m ′ . On the other hand, if γ(ϕ) = m = γ(ψ), then f (f → (m, m)) ∈ T RU E, since m ≤ m. It follows that (M, γ) ϕ ≡ ψ. Q.E.D.
Corollary 3.4 Principle SP is valid:
This result also provides the following semantical interpretation of SP. If ψ, ψ ′ and ϕ are formulas such that ψ is a subformula of ϕ, and ψ has the same denotation as ψ ′ , then ϕ has the same denotation as ϕ ′ , where ϕ ′ is the result of replacing ψ in ϕ by ψ ′ .
Our next goal is to prove that S1+SP is sound. Let M be a model with universe M . With a given assignment γ : V → M we may associate a truth-value assignment β γ : V → {0, 1} defined by β γ (x) = 1 :⇔ γ(x) ∈ T RU E. It follows that for all nonmodal propositional formulas ϕ, γ(ϕ) ∈ T RU E ⇔ β γ (ϕ) = 1. Thus, (M, γ) ϕ, for all propositional tautologies ϕ. Now suppose ϕ is a modal formula having the form of a propositional tautology, i.e. ϕ is the result of replacements of variables by modal formulas within a propositional tautology. By soundness of SP, Corollary 3.4, ϕ has the same denotation as the original tautology. This holds in every model, thus ϕ is valid. Since f ⊤ ∈ T RU E, axiom (ii) is valid. Axiom (iii) says that the lattice ordering of any model is transitive. We have shown that the S1-axioms (i)-(iii) are valid. The validity of (iv)-(vi) is guaranteed by Corollary 3.4. Obviously, rule MP is sound. It is wellknown that in any Boolean algebra, any assignment maps all propositional tautologies to the top element of the lattice. Thus, if ϕ is an axiom of the form (i), then ϕ is valid. The conditions (v) and (vi) of Definition 3.1 ensure that the same holds for axioms of the form (ii) and (iii), respectively. Thus, rule AN is sound (recall that we have restricted the application of AN to axioms of the form (i)-(iii)). The soundness of the deductive system now follows by induction on the length of a derivation. 
The Completeness Theorem
In order to prove strong completeness of S1+SP we follow the usual strategy. We call a set of formulas consistent if there is a formula which is not derivable from that set. A set which is not consistent is called inconsistent. A maximal consistent set of formulas is a consistent set such that every proper extension is inconsistent. From standard arguments it follows that each consistent set extends to a maximal consistent set. It remains to show that a maximal consistent set has a model. We will tacitly make use of the following well-known properties of a maximal consistent set Φ. These properties follow from propositional logic:
Definition 4.1 For a maximal consistent set Φ we define a relation
Lemma 4.2 Let Φ be a maximal consistent set. The relation ≈ Φ is an equivalence relation on F m with the following properties:
• If ϕ ≈ Φ ψ, then ϕ ∈ Φ ⇔ ψ ∈ Φ.
•
Proof. Symmetry of ≈ Φ follows from propositional logic. Since ϕ → ϕ is an axiom, we get (ϕ → ϕ) ∈ Φ by rule AN. Thus, ≈ Φ is reflexive. Transitivity follows from the scheme of axioms (iii). Now suppose ϕ 1 ≈ Φ ψ 1 and ϕ 2 ≈ Φ ψ 2 . Let x = y be variables such that x does not occur in ψ 2 and y does not occur in ϕ 1 . Then by SP and MP:
. The remaining cases of the first item of the Lemma follow similarly. The second item of the Lemma follows from the scheme of axioms (ii). Finally, the third item follows from the previous assertions of the Lemma. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4.3 Any maximal consistent has a model.
Proof. Let Φ be a maximal consistent set of formulas. By ϕ we denote the equivalence class of ϕ ∈ F m modulo ≈ Φ . We are going to construct a model with the following ingredients:
By Lemma 4.2, all these ingredients are well-defined. We may define operations for join f ∨ , meet f ∧ , top element f ⊤ and bottom element f ⊥ by means of the given operations f ¬ and f → . In order to prove that the defined operations form a Boolean algebra on M it suffices to show that the elements of M satisfy the equations which axiomatize the class of Boolean algebras. As an example, we choose the commutativity of the meet operation: Let M be the constructed model. We consider the canonical assignment γ : V → M defined by x → x. By induction on ϕ one shows that γ(ϕ) = ϕ, for any formula ϕ.
Corollary 4.4 (Completeness Theorem
Proof. Φ ϕ implies the consistency of Φ ∪ {¬ϕ}. We extend this set to a maximal consistent set which, by Lemma 4.3, has a model. Consequently, Φ ϕ. Q.E.D.
Conclusions
We saw that replacing rule SPSE with the stronger principle SP in modal logic S1 results in a non-normal modal logic which has a natural algebraic semantics. In this section, we discuss the relationships between S1+SP and the Lewis systems S1-S3. We also show that our semantics extends straightforwardly to semantics for the Lewis systems S3-S5, given by certain modal algebras. As a negative result, we shall see that neither S1 nor S2 can be captured by our semantics.
The Substitution Principle SP, which is equivalent with the axioms (iv)-(vi), ensures that the identity connective, defined as strict equivalence, satisfies the following identity axioms:
Proof. We will use (3) (ϕ → ψ) → ( ϕ → ψ) which is an axiom scheme of S3. By AN, ((ϕ ↔ ψ) → (¬ϕ ↔ ¬ψ)). By (3),
. This is the first theorem given in the lemma. By
. This is equivalent with
. This is the second theorem given in the lemma. We put χ 1 := (ϕ → ψ), χ 2 := (ψ → ϕ), δ 1 := ( ϕ → ψ), δ 2 := ( ψ → ϕ). Rule AN applied to (3) yields (χ 1 → δ 1 ) and (χ 2 → δ 2 ). Thus, (χ 1 → δ 1 ) ∧ (χ 2 → δ 2 ) is derivable in S3, and therefore also ((χ 1 → δ 1 ) ∧ (χ 2 → δ 2 )). By AN we also derive (((χ 1 → δ 1 ) ∧ (χ 2 → δ 2 )) → ((χ 1 ∧ χ 2 ) → (δ 1 ∧ δ 2 ))). Now axiom K and rule MP yield ((χ 1 ∧ χ 2 ) → (δ 1 ∧ δ 2 )). This is the third theorem in the lemma. Q.E.D.
Corollary 5.4 S1+ SP is a sublogic of S3 (and differs from S2).
( (ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ ( ϕ ∧ ψ)) is a theorem of S4. Thus, models satisfying (3')+(4') are specific modal algebras. Now it is clear how to modify our original completeness proof in order to obtain the following results.
Corollary 5.8 S3 is sound and complete w.r.t. the semantics generated by the class of all models that satisfy the condition (3') . S4 is sound and complete w.r.t. the semantics given by the class of all models that satisfy (3' ) and (4') . Finally, S5 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of models that satisfy the constraints (3'), (4' ) and (5' ).
Of course, we get strong completeness results such as formulated in Theorem 4.4. We conclude that our approach provides an uniform semantical framework for the "Lewis-like" modal logic S1+SP and the Lewis systems S3-S5. By Theorem 5.1, the systems S1 and S2 cannot be captured. If we enlarge the language by a connective ≡, then S1+SP augmented with the axiom scheme (ϕ ≡ ψ) ↔ (ϕ ↔ ψ) can be seen as a minimal amalgam of Suszko's basic non-Fregean logic SCI [2] and Lewis modal logic S1.
